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"THE TASK OF HEARING WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN
SAID"': HISTORY AND NATIVE AMERICAN LEGAL CLAIMS
By Aviam Soifer*
The words of the Ba'al Shem Tov inscribed at Yad Vashem, the
Holocaust Memorial in Jerusalem, remind us that "The key to redemp-
tion is remembrance".2 Remembrance itself is a mitzvah, a sacred
obligation, anchored in repeated scriptural injunctions. Children who
become bar and bat mitzvot at age thirteen may learn that the verb
zakhor (remember) occurs in the Bible 13 x 13 or 169 times, (and
they are taught that this numerology is significant). The word appears
"usually with either Israel or God as the subject, for memory is
incumbent upon both".3 Yet there are crucial differences - as well as
significant overlaps - between memory of the past; meaning in history;
and historical inquiry largely concerned with accurate chronology and
concrete facts. Too often, the term "history" is used to blur or ignore
these differences.
To illuminate this point, this essay considers everal recent invoca-
The phrase quoted is a subheading from Robert A. Williams, Jr., "Documents of
Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of European Racism and Colonialism in
the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law", 31 Ariz. L. Rev. 237, 258 (1989).
Using the work of Albert Memmi, a Tunisian Jew who survived a Nazi work
camp, Williams offers a powerful taxonomy of racism that he claims is applic-
able to legal treatment of tribalism and of Native American claims specifically.
* Dean and Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. Many people were remark-
ably hospitable to me and my family during our last visit to Tel Aviv University,
and particularly helpful as I thought about this essay. Among them were: President
Yoram Dinstein and Dean Ariel Rosen-Zvi; Professors Natan Lerner, Kenneth Mann,
Sasson Samekh, Amos Shapira and Leon Sheleff; and Doctors Karen Alkaly-Gut,
Arnon Gutfeld and Haggai Hurvitz. I am also very grateful to the staff of the
Israel Yearbook of Human Rights, to Vicki Schlachet, and to my extraordinary
research assistants Janet Judge and Brad Steiner.
2 It seems fitting to begin with this quotation, which concluded my discussion of
the role of "involuntary groups" in Anglo-American jurisprudence in Aviam Soifer,
"On Being Overly Discrete and Insular: Involuntary Groups and the Anglo-American
Judicial Tradition", 20 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 243 (1990). This essay
is a continuation of that exploration.
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tions of history by American judges. It does so in the context of Native
American legal claims,' but its point about the demands and abuse of
history has broader implications. My argument is that each of three
distinct judicial approaches to the past exemplified by these decisions
is seriously flawed. Taken together, however, these cases underscore
how claims purportedly derived from history can become a powerful
whipsaw. As we will see, these recent decisions employ history incon-
sistently, yet with devastating effectiveness, against Indian claims. They
demonstrate how commonplace it is for judges to make claims based
on history, while blithely remaining blind to the crucial understand-
ings at the confluence of memory, meaning and historical accuracy.
Judicial lapses in remembrance are hardly trivial. Indeed, such flaws
extend far beyond specific results - the bottom line - in the three
decisions at issue. None of these cases is in itself of great import.
Even the two United States Supreme Court decisions appear almost
insignificant in their specific outcomes. But the horrors of this century
show that even if "[r]esponsibility for a burdened past can justifiably
become less preoccupying as other experiences are added to the national
legacy", it remains inestimably important to understand that "like the
half-life of radioactive material, there is no point at which responsibility
simply goes away".
Decisions that undermine Native American legal claims are hardly
unusual in the United States' history. Yet these three very recent
decisions vividly indicate some of the routine ways in which judges
have followed soldiers and settlers in a rush to establish a new "reality
on the ground", a legal fait accompli that somehow is said to legit-
imize unburdening the American landscape of its most longstanding
population. In the modern (or postmodern) world, measured judicial
words do immeasurable violence to what was and what could be. It is
still a remarkable, bitter irony that at the core of each of these judicial
opinions lies the assertion that history itself compels the extirpation
of memory, meaning and precision about the United States' past
burdens.
That irony is equalled, if not exceeded, when we begin to discern
the techniques contemporary judges employ to devalue and ultimately
4 I generally use the term "Native American", but also employ "Indian" when that
seems to make historical or stylistic sense. The claims discussed involve quite
different legal matters. They concern, respectively, government benefits, land claims
and sovereignty over hunting and fishing rights.




dismiss the weight of words themselves. Justice Antonin Scalia, now
joined by his acolyte, Justice Clarence Thomas, likes to insist that
there must be strict judicial fidelity to legal texts. Yet when we turn
to majority opinions written by Scalia J. and Thomas J., we see they
simply wave away directly relevant texts and language. As part of the
Court's unseemly gallop toward more limited governmental responsi-
bility in respect to Native Americans - or in respect to anyone else,
for that matter - these Justices resort to the spirit of abstract concepts
and to dubious claims of implicit past understandings.
In a strange kind of symbiosis, the Justices then assign responsi-
bility to history for the outcomes they struggle to reach. They use history
to trump texts that quite clearly seem to point in the opposite
direction. In the third decision, the Vermont Supreme Court similarly
invokes history. This version is an even more abstract concept of
implicit, cumulative, and undifferentiated encumbering by the past.
All three decisions clearly invoke "history". In all three, however,
memory is made irrelevant, meaning is stretched past the breaking point,
and accuracy about he past is made to seem entirely irrelevant.
Unfortunately, these three decisions exemplify the way in which many
contemporary American judges seek a unified, generalized vision called
History. There seems to be a compulsion to find some fixed, "correct"
rule for interpreting language. That propensity is particularly striking in
the context of legal claims by Native Americans.
The first decision pays homage to Abstract History; the second to
Cumulative History; and the last to Implicit History. All are entirely
unsatisfactory. Moreover, in their purported quest for the compulsion of
history, the Justices play fast and loose with legal language and with
its historical meaning. This contrasts sharply with the Native American
perspective. Among Native Americans, as Bruce Swann described it,
"Reality is not 'controlled', no matter on how high a plane. We would
do better to talk of reciprocity, balancing, right acting and right telling
in the interests of equilibrium".6 It is always dangerous to make
sweeping generalizations, of course, but at a minimum, reciprocity,
balancing, right acting and right telling might serve well as judicial
goals. It is noteworthy that these qualities are sorely lacking in recent
judicial responses to the claims of Native Americans.
6 Smoothing the Ground: Essays on Native American Oral Literature xi (B. Swann
ed., 1983) Swann quotes Lame Deer's explanation: "We Indians live in a world
of symbols and images where the spiritual and the commonplace are one". Ibid.,
xii, quoting John Fire/Lame Deer and Richard Erdoes, Lame Deer, Seeker of Visions
101 (1972).
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1. VILLAGE OF NOATAK: HISTORY AS AN ABSTRACTION
Judicial myopia about history in the context of Native American rights
is itself a tragic old story.' The recent case of Blatchford v. Native Village
of Noatak' proves, however, that a story need not be old to be tragic,
comic, or both. In this seemingly dry, technical decision about the
sovereign immunity of state governments, Native American tribal
identity became entangled in the loose ends of one of the most abstract
and convoluted topics in American constitutional law. In holding that
a Native village could not sue Alaska, Justice Scalia's majority opinion
began by conceding that "Indian tribes are sovereigns".' Justice Scalia
had to admit that the Court was not relying on the text of the Eleventh
Amendment, but rather on "the presupposition of our constitutional
structure which [the Eleventh Amendment] confirms".o (This reliance
on untethered structural presuppositions is striking in itself, but even
more so because it emerged from the word processor of a Justice who
insistently claims to be a strict textualist.) Yet our concern is not with
a mystical form of Eleventh Amendment doctrine. What is significant
about Native Village of Noatak is how the Court hacked through a
basic historical riddle: the Gordian knot of the legal status of Native
American tribes.
From the decisions of Chief Justice John Marshall through the Court's
most recent precedents, the sovereignty of tribes in North America
has been anomalous, inconsistent, and remarkably malleable.
Pronouncements on the subject by all the branches of the federal
government, and by both federal and state courts, have fluctuated with
See generally M. Ball, "Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes", [1987] Am. B. Found.
Res. J. 3; R. Williams, Jr., The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The
Discourses of Conquest (1990); R. Strickland, "Dances with Lawyers: Wolves,
Judges, and Other Medicine Men", 69 Tex. L. Rev. 995 (1991).
1 l S. Ct. 2578 (1991). Justice Scalia wrote for the majority and Justice Blackmun
dissented, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens.
9 Ibid., 2581.
1o The Eleventh Amendment states: "The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law and equity, commenced or prose-
cuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens
or Subjects of any Foreign State". For the remarkably complicated history of the
amendment, see J. Orth, The Judicial Power of the United States: The Eleventh
Amendment in American History (1987). That Scalia J. and his fellow textualists
practice a peculiar and an inconsistent brand of originalism is obvious to any reader
of the Court's opinions, but the point is captured succinctly in G. Kannar, "The
Legal Catechism of Antonin Scalia", 99 Yale L.J. 1297 (1990); G. Reynolds,
"Penumbral Reasoning on the Right", 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1333 (1992).
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changing demands made by the majority culture." Today, however, it
is allegedly clear again that surviving Native American tribes did retain
their sovereignty; tribal self-determination is again repeatedly said to
be an overriding value.12
The puzzle presented in Noatak, therefore, was whether renewed legal
sensitivity about tribal sovereignty involves recognition of sovereignty
akin to that of foreign States, or sovereignty that is analogous to that
of the fifty states within the federal union. This categorization was
crucial: on the one hand, Eleventh Amendment doctrine shields states
within the United States from suit by foreign sovereigns. On the other
hand, any state may sue another state without confronting an Eleventh
Amendment barrier.'3 This suit came to the Court from as far away as
possible - the Native Village of Noatak is located on the Bering Strait
- and the Justices got nowhere near either the practical realities of the
case or any relevant history. Centuries of development, and the Court's
own "grandaddy" decisions about tribal status, simply landed in the
Justices' conceptualist dustbin.
The suit arose when Alaska reneged on a 1980 Statute that granted
every Native Village $25,000. On the advice of Alaska's Attorney
General, however, the legislature later expanded the recipient class,
thereby diluting the share of each Native Village, so that Noatak never
received its full initial allotment.14 The case presented an array of
" Ball, supra note 7, provides a wonderfully clear and convincing demonstration
of inconsistencies and obtuseness within the "shabby tales composed by the
Supreme Court" as the Justices repeatedly have manipulated legal doctrine to
reassert the apparent paradox that "the law is that might is the basis of federal power
over Indian nations". [1987] Am. B. Found. Res. J. 139, 137.
12 See generally N. J. Newton, "Federal Power Over Indians: its Sources, Scope
and Limitations", 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 195 (1984). The Court celebrated self-
determination in Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian
Tribe of Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 505, 510 (1991), for example, quoting California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987): "These Acts reflect
Congress' desire to promote 'the goal of Indian self-government, including its "over-
riding goal" of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development'."
' Compare Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934) with South Dakota v. North
Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904). For the current doctrine and background of the legal
tangle surrounding the "anachronistic fiction" of sovereign immunity, see Oklahoma
Tax Comm'n, 498 U.S. at 514 (Stevens, J., concurring); V. Jackson, "Jackson,
The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity",
98 Yale L.J. 1 (1988); J. Orth, supra note 10.
14 Noatak was joined by two other tribal entities in its suit. The state Attorney General
had advised that the 1980 Statute, in specifying Native Villages for beneficial
treatment, violated equal protection. Though Alaska has run into equal protection
difficulties in attempts to distribute some of the bounty from the oil pipeline to
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complicated jurisdictional issues, but the majority answered with a
simple, sweeping, surprising assertion: Native American tribes are like
foreign nations. Such tribes are Native and American; they are under
the plenary power and alleged protection of the federal government; and
their members are all citizens of the United States, but the tribe as a
tribe is more like Monaco than Montana.
What appealed to Scalia J. and his colleagues, of course, was that
the Court's stark choice immunized states against tribal claims. The
Court's holding about tribal identity was anything but the product
of enlightened revisionist history. Rather, Scalia J. offered only a
pseudo-formalistic choice, which he purportedly premised on the
original intent of the constitutional framers: "Just as in Monaco with
regard to foreign sovereigns, so also here with regard to Indian tribes,
there is no compelling evidence that the Founders thought such a
surrender [of immunity] inherent in the constitutional compact." But
this is remarkably abstract metaphysics. There can be no "compelling
evidence" about an issue no one could have imagined at the time.
As Judge John T. Noonan, Jr. held for the lower court in the case,
Indian tribes clearly were treated as separate sovereigns long before
1789. They could be found in every original state and relations with
them were sensitive and dangerous. Moreover, when a political crisis
arose over Georgia's defiance of the Court in the context of the
Cherokee Removal during Andrew Jackson's presidency, Chief Justice
John Marshall explicitly rejected the idea that tribes were foreign
states." It is therefore deeply ironic that the Court in Noatak simply
citizens, on the basis of their relative longevity within the state (Zobel v. Williams,
457 U.S. 55 (1982)), the Attorney General's opinion here seems dubious at best.
It would not have been difficult, for example, to prove through the totality of
circumstances the kind of past discrimination needed to defend the statutory plan
if any plaintiff actually had been able to overcome jurisdictional difficulties and
wished to launch an equal protection attack.
At the most basic level, the treatment of Alaska's Native Peoples who had
welcomed white settlers, as directly analogous to "conquered" tribes in the "lower
48" states flies in the face of history, despite the lumping together of all Native
Americans for purposes of federal government control upheld in Tee-Hit-Ton
Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955). Moreover, recently the Court
repeatedly has upheld differential treatment of Native Americans quite readily,
arguing that such classifications are political, not racial, and therefore need only
be rationally related to some acceptable governmental purpose. See, e.g., Morton
v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974); Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S.
463 (1979).
" Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17-18 (1831). Marshall specifi-
cally held that an Indian tribe might be a nation, but that a tribe "is not a foreign
state, in the sense of the constitution". Ibid. In this decision, and again in Worcester
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waded into the flood of legal developments over several centuries, in
which Indian tribes had been tragically sui generis, and tried to float
clear on the flimsy assumption that the relevant inquiry is simply the
relative role of the states, foreign nations, and tribes in the Constitutional
Convention. According to Scalia J., it is plausible to imagine that the
states surrendered sovereign immunity on a theory of mutuality in 1789,
but "[t]here is no such mutuality with either foreign sovereigns or Indian
tribes".'6 Ergo, according to Scalia J., Indian tribes are like foreign
nations.
At first glance, the contention that tribal sovereignty is analogous
to that of foreign nations may seem a great victory for tribal identity.
If it were taken seriously and followed in other contexts, it would
have important unanticipated implications, for example, in the realms
of international law and human rights guarantees. The analogy to foreign
nations also serves to underscore a whole series of basic contradic-
tions in the legal status of Native Americans. Within the logic of Noatak,
for example, they have had a unique form of dual citizenship thrust upon
them. As we shall see, however, the Court's approach in Noatak has
actually been but one in a series of extremely statist decisions that
have emerged recently in the Court's treatment of rights claimed by
Native Americans, either as individuals or as members of groups."
v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), Marshall emphasized the relationship
between the federal government and the Indian tribes. He did so directly against
claims of state sovereignty that Georgia had vigorously pursued to the point of
creating a national crisis. Marshall's approach as well as his language cannot be
reconciled with that of the Noatak Court's embrace of Alaska's state sovereign
immunity claims. Instead, Marshall constructed the "dependent domestic nations"
categorization of the tribal relationship to the federal government that has
dominated, and haunted, Indian law ever since. For a careful study of the back-
ground of the Georgia cases, see J. Burke, "The Cherokee Cases: A Study in
Law, Politics, and Morality", 21 Stan. L. Rev. 500 (1969).
6 111 S. Ct. at 4805. The specific state sovereign immunity issue had been dis-
cussed earlier only in scattered dicta, largely because the prevalent theory was
that the federal government had plenary power over the tribes, including the right
and the duty to sue states on their behalf, thus overcoming any Eleventh Amendment
barrier. A 1966 statutory change xplicitly altered federal court jurisdiction to
give tribes the ability to sue by themselves, but the Court in Noatak held that
Congress had not been adequately explicit to lift the states' Eleventh Amendment
barrier.
17 When Native American religious claims were at stake, for example, Scalia J.
again wrote for the Court, purporting to recognize the "relative disadvantage" of
minority religious practices. Yet he relegated such religious claims exclusively to
protection through the political process, proclaiming this to be the "unavoidable
consequence of democratic government". Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
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The Court's belated rediscovery of tribal sovereignty, deemed akin to
foreign sovereignty in Noatak, may be merely a stepping stone to further
erosion of the legal claims of Native Americans, who are thus doubly
alienated."
Even when recognizing tribal authority the Justices also have
reemphasized Congress's plenary power over tribes." To be sure, it is
not easy to classify tribal groups or to categorize the range of their
authority. As a legal entity, the tribe has not been respected as "a distinct
political society separated from others, capable of managing its own
affairs and governing itself"2 0 since the days of John Marshall. Even
Marshall's idea of a "dependent domestic nation" marked an unwieldy,
ambiguous compromise. But if ever freedom of association should have
constitutional clout, it ought to be in cases brought by remaining Native
American tribes that assert tribal rights.21 Yet in Village of Noatak,
the Court raced high enough up the ladder of legal abstraction to ignore
centuries of history. From that height, it was relatively easy to proclaim
1 See U.S. v. Alvarez-Nachain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (foreign citizens not entitled
to protection from kidnapping by federal government); V. Deloria, Jr., "Laws
Founded in Justice and Humanity: Reflections on the Content and Character
of American Indian Law", 21 Ariz. L. Rev. 202 (1989); V. Deloria, Jr. and C. M.
Lytle, The Nations Within: The Past And Future of American Indian Sovereignty
(1984).
' See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of
Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 505 (1991) (unanimous decision holding that a state may
not tax tribal members but, despite longstanding practice, may prospectively tax
sales by tribal members to non-members); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 684
(1990) (holding that "the inherent sovereignty of the Indian tribes does not extend
to criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit crimes on the reservation");
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (rejecting individual sex
discrimination claim against tribe on jurisdictional ground, holding that Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968 protects tribal sovereignty, but emphasizing Congress's plenary
power to override tribal authority if it sees fit). Ironically, in Hodel v. Irving,
481 U.S. 704, 718 (1987), the Court unanimously held that Congress's plenary
power did not extend to a good faith effort to deal with a serious, intractable problem
- the "extreme fractionation of Indian lands". Although the Court conceded that
the congressional plan would benefit all members of the tribes, and that the
fractionation problem was a product of the "disastrous" federal allotment policy
and would be compounded over time, the Justices determined that the right of
individual property holders to pass on even de minimis property holdings was so
vital as to invalidate the statute on constitutional grounds.
20 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17-18 (1831).
21 1 make an extended argument for redefining and recognizing the importance of such
a right in a book I am finishing, which has the working title, Keeping Company:
Groups In American Law and Letters (forthcoming).
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Native American tribes to be akin to foreign nations without thinking
much about possible implications.22
II. STATE V ELLIOTT: HISTORY AS CUMULATIVE
Just as formalistic manipulation of categories can be used to defeat
tribal legal claims, so can purportedly hard-boiled, contemporary policy
judgments. The Vermont Supreme Court, for example, recently denied
the aboriginal rights of Abenaki Indians to fish in the streams of their
ancestral homelands without state licenses.23 The case arose when
Native Americans staged a "fish-in" demonstration. The defendants were
members of a group of 36 people whose defense against charges of
fishing without a license invoked "aboriginal rights", premised on
their membership in a viable tribe that had existed from "time im-
memorial" and that had never ceded its land.24
The Vermont Supreme Court succinctly and unanimously rejected the
Native American claims. The core of Justice Morse's opinion for the
Court was that the Indian claims had been voided by "the increasing
weight of history".2 5 As the Court rejected a trial court decision that
had dismissed the criminal charges against the Abenaki, the Justices
maintained that it simply did not matter that the Abenaki had never
ceded their claims by treaty. The Court held that the extinguishing of
Native American claims occurred, not through any discrete events, but
rather via "the cumulative effect of many historical events".26
The cumulative events the Court relied upon involved the period
preceding Vermont's statehood, which the Court conceded was such
"a confusing era" that the Court refused to decide whether or not the
government of Vermont did or did not enjoy legal sovereignty over
22 Part of the problem, of course, is that there may not be any implications in a
Court that seems little concerned about consistency even within contemporary
decisions. In County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 249 (1985),
for example, the Court simply proclaimed that ribes are not akin to foreign nations
for purposes of invoking the political question doctrine. See generally D. C.
Williams, "The Borders of the Equal Protection Clause: Indians as Peoples", 38
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 759 (1991) and a response by C. Goldberg-Ambrose, and
Williams' reply, at 39 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 169 and 191 (1991).
23 State of Vermont v. Elliott, 616 A. 2d 210 (1992).
24 Under Vermont law, there is an exception to fishing license requirements for persons
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the land in question.27 Nonetheless, the alchemy of teleological faith
transformed old wrongs. Progress, or at least a long line of dubious
white land grabs and unsubstantiated legal maneuverings, simply
trumped clear, longstanding aboriginal rights.28 Moreover, specific
attention to history might undercut the basic ideal of treating everyone
the same. As the local State's Attorney said in celebration of the
decision: "We think this affirms our position all along . . . that all
Vermonters are equal before the law".29
III. SOUTH DAKOTA V BOURLAND: HISTORY AS IMPLICIT
The United States government and the Sioux Nation signed the Fort
Laramie Treaty in 1868, their second effort to end the Powder River
War that began when the US Army came to the aid of settlers who
had claimed sovereignty over the Great Plains. Under the 1868 Treaty,
the Sioux agreed to remain within the "Great Sioux Reservation",
some 26 million acres "set apart for absolute and undisturbed use
and occupation" by the Sioux. 30 The United States also agreed that
non-Indians would not "ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon,
27 Ibid., 221, 220.
2 The Vermont Supreme Court described the lower court's "exhaustive effort" that
produced "extensive and meticulous findings and determined that the Abenaki
had settled in northwest Vermont by 9300 B.C. and had occupied that area as
"an intact tribe" from that date to the present. Ibid., 214. But the Supreme Court
decided that voluminous genealogical, ethnological, and archaeological evidence
of an unbroken tribal presence faded away before the dubious claims of squatters
and adventurers. The Court simply inferred that the early white settlers of Vermont
- in the admitted absence of any explicit legal extinguishment of aboriginal title
- eliminated Native American claims through the simple expedient of cumulatively
wishing to do so.
For anthropological and legal critiques of another attempt o wrestle with a
similar, longstanding clash of cultures in a contemporary courtroom, see "Identity
in Mashpee", in J. Clifford, The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century
Ethnography, Literature, and Art 277 (1988); G. Torres and K. Milun, "Translating
Yonnandio by Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case", [1990] Duke
LJ. 625.
29 "Vermont Court Says History Voids Land Claims of Abenaki Indians", N.Y. Times,
18 June 1992, at D23.
30 15 Stat. 635 (1868). The treaty forbade further cession of lands, absent formal
written approval "by at least three-fourths of all the adult male Indians," Ibid., at
Article 12. Within a decade, however, Congress explicitly broke the 1868 Treaty.
In 1877, Congress formally adopted a purported agreement signed by 10 percent
of the Sioux men. In the wake of the ferociously severe winter of 1875-76, the
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or reside in" the Great Sioux Reservation.3' By 1889, however, Congress
had decided to remove a great deal of land from the existing reserva-
tion and to subdivide the remaining territory into several reservations.3 2
Moreover, by then Congress already had superimposed the allotment
policy of the Dawes Act of 1887 that sought explicitly to break up
the tribal structure, to transform Indian land into individual fee simple
parcels, to establish the federal government as trustee for the bulk of
the land, and gradually to permit resale of land to non-Indians.3 3
Over a century ago, nonetheless, even the Supreme Court recog-
nized that it was tragically clear that the "very weakness and
helplessness" of the Indians actually came about "due to the course
of dealing of the federal government with them".34 The Court also
emphasized that the federal government owed the Indians a duty of
"care and protection"." It followed, said the Court, that "technical
rules" ought not to be used against Indian claims; rather, equitable
principles and "that larger reason which constitutes the spirit of the
law of nations" provided a legal basis to favour the substance of Indian
claims, despite technical barriers.36
Battle of Little Big Horn and the Indians' subsequent defeat at Wounded Knee,
some of the Indians - denied even subsistence rations by official congressional
policy and deprived of all their horses and weapons - relinquished their rights to
the Black Hills and other land. The 10 per cent who "agreed" also gave up hunting
rights in some unceded land in exchange for the rations desperately needed for
survival. The bare bones of the legal and social history of this decade is set out
in United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 377-81 (1980).
* 15 Stat. 635, 636.
32 Act of March 2, 1889, Ch. 406, 25 Stat. 888. Of those rights guaranteed the Sioux
under the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty, this 1889 Act now guaranteed only those
"not in conflict" with the new statute. Sec. 19, 25 Stat. 896.
33 The General Allotment Act of 1887, Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, otherwise known as
the Dawes Severalty Act, was a reform measure premised on the assumption that
Indians in their tribal units lacked what Dawes described as the "selfishness which
is at the bottom of civilization", quoted in A. Debo, And Still the Waters Run 21-22
(1940). Its story is told well in D.S. Otis, The Dawes Act and the Allotment of Indian
Lands (F. P. Prucha ed., 1973).
3 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886) (upholding the Major
Crimes Act of 1885, removing jurisdiction over seven criminal offences from the
tribes).
* Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 28 (1886). For further details about
the legal entanglements of the Choctaw, who had been slave-holders and who
aligned themselves with the losing side in the Civil War, see Aviam Soifer, "The
Paradox of Paternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: United States Supreme
Court, 1888-1921", 5 Law and History Rev. 249, 266-68 (1987).
36 119 U.S. at 28.
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James Bradley Thayer, a renowned Brahmin and Harvard Law School
professor, described for the educated general readership of the Atlantic
Monthly in 1891 a flood of abuses and misconceived efforts to aid
Indians, whom he considered "A People Without Law". Thayer argued
that now the federal government owed the Indians an affirmative duty.
"The mere neglect or refusal to act is itself action", Thayer explained,
"and action of the worst kind".37 Thayer invoked history to demolish
the very notion that neutrality or neglect could constitute fairness in
the context of governmental dealings with Indian tribes. He wrote
against the vivid backdrop of devastation wrought through past
encounters between government officials and the Indians.
When the Supreme Court revisited the Fort Laramie Treaty and its
complicated legal aftermath more than a century later, however, history
washed away entirely. In South Dakota v. Bourland," Justice Thomas's
majority opinion held that a series of federal Flood Control Acts in
the 1940s and 1950s had deprived the Sioux not merely of still more
of their trust lands, but also of the power to regulate hunting and fishing
by non-Indians within the reservation. The tribe had decided it would
no longer allow non-Indians to hunt deer on the sole basis of their South
Dakota hunting licenses. Instead, it now sought to regulate the hunt
itself, and to do its own licensing of non-Indians on reservation lands
taken for flood control purposes by the federal government.
To the Bourland majority, the purpose of the relevant federal
legislation - which nowhere even mentioned abrogation of Indian
sovereignty over hunting and fishing - was not decisive. It was not even
relevant. Instead, Thomas emphasized that "the effect of the transfer
is the destruction of pre-existing Indian rights to regulatory control".39
This, of course, is circular reasoning. That was not the effect until the
Court so legitimized it in this opinion. The Court's logical legerde-
main here - its emphasis on effect and its view that Congressional
purpose was irrelevant - is even more striking because it contrasted
so starkly with the Court's repeated insistence over the past several
decades that a demonstration of discriminatory purpose is a necessary
prerequisite for proof of an equal protection violation.4 0 Effect will
" Thayer's two-part article, "A People Without Law", appeared in the October and
November, 1891 issues of the Atlantic Monthly at 540 and 676. The quoted passage
is at 678.
3 1993 U.S. LEXIS 4034 (14 June 1993).
39 Ibid., 25.
* There has been considerable discussion of this doctrinal development over the
past two decades. For a summary of that literature and my own views, see "On
Being Overly Discrete and Insular", supra note 2.
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not suffice to prove constitutional discrimination, but it is adequate to
remove the jurisdiction of another sovereign based entirely on unwritten,
implicit practices.
This is particularly ironic against the backdrop of the Court's
concession that "pursuant to its original treaty with the United States,
the Cheyenne River Tribe possessed both the greater power to exclude
non-Indians from, and arguably the less-included, incidental power to
regulate non-Indian use of the lands later taken for the Oahe Dam and
Reservoir Project".' That the greater power includes the lesser power
is a favourite trope of the conservative wing of the Court. Therefore,
such a statement was ominous even when it initially appeared to favour
tribal control. The concept quickly was inverted and used against the
Sioux. Premising his claim on two shaky recent precedents, Thomas
wrote that "when an Indian tribe conveys ownership of its tribal lands
to non-Indians, it loses any former right of exclusive use and occupa-
tion of the conveyed lands".42 Thomas then administered the coup de
grace. He proclaimed, "The abrogation of this greater right . .. implies
the loss of regulatory jurisdiction over the use of the land by others".4
By this logic, there is virtually nothing left of tribal sovereignty.
Congress has plenary power, which necessarily implies power to
abrogate all tribal powers whenever it wishes. And, according to this
bizarre syllogism, the tribe should have understood, many years prior
to this judicial proclamation of a radically new doctrine, that it was
giving away all lesser tribal power when it yielded to governmental
demands for land under the Flood Control Act of 1944.
As if this logic were not faulty enough, the majority soon made its
position even less defencible. Congress had reserved limited land-use
rights for the tribe. Somehow this protection of tribal rights supported
the repeal of all other rights by implication. Thomas put it bluntly:
"When Congress reserves limited rights to a tribe or its members, the
very presence of such a limited reservation of rights suggests that the
Indians would otherwise be treated like the public at large".44 This is
41 1993 U.S. LEXIS 4034, at 17.
42 Ibid., 19, relying on Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation,
492 U.S. 408 (1989) and Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). For a
devastating critique of the sharply-divided decision in Brendale, and of its
relationship to Montana, see J. Singer, "Sovereignty and Property", 86 NW. U.L.
Rev. 1 (1991).
43 1993 U.S. LEXIS at 19. The Court did not reach the question of whether a dif-
ferent result might follow were the government's greater power said to imply the
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a striking example of the Power of the Initial (Legal) Presumption. Here
the presumption works with devastating effectiveness against any and
all tribal claims because it simply assumes that Indians are in no way
an historically special group. Although a tribe may be akin to a foreign
nation under Noatak, it and its members simply are to be considered
"like the public at large", unless Congress explicitly states otherwise
as a matter of largess. Thomas gave lip-service only to the standard
principle that "statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the
Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit".45
Over 150 years ago, the Court stated that Indian occupancy rights
were "as sacred as the fee simple of whites,"46 and that Indian tribes
retain a "right to the lands they occupy, until that right shall be
extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government".4 7 But the
flamboyant presumptions and spurious logic of contemporary decisions,
such as Noatak and Bourland, turn older ideas and precedents upside
down. To be sure, the ongoing conquest of Indian lands - and the
often brutal collaborative actions by Congress, the Executive, and the
courts - hardly heeded the words of early judicial decisions that sought
to protect Indian legal claims. Surely this harsh historical reality does
not excuse judges today who play fast and loose with precedents and
with purportedly logical constraints. If anything, past judicial complicity
in outrages perpetrated against Native Americans ought to make today's
judges particularly sensitive to historical claims. Yet Abstract History,
Cumulative History, and Implicit History all seem to flow together in
the three decisions we considered. At their confluence, history is, in
fact, not relevant at all.
CONCLUSION
The careless, perhaps even cynical, manipulation of foundational words
and past deeds in these three contemporary opinions contrasts starkly
with the power of words and great weight of the past as they are
4 This is standard, boiler-plate language that stretches back for more than a century.
Thomas quotes Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683, 693 (1992),
quoting older decisions for the idea. Other citations he omitted would have empha-
sized both the longevity and the respectability of the idea that in construing statutes
and treaties "the language used in treaties with the Indians shall never be con-
strued to their prejudice", as Chief Justice John Marshall put it in the famous
decision, Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 582 (1832).
46 Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835).
47 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
190
NATIVE AMERICANS
articulated in Native American cultures. That tradition emphasizes
"the rich complexity of meanings"4 8 in traditional American Indian
narratives. Karl Kroeber and other authors convincingly make the case
that "[i]t is our scholarship, not Indian literature, which is 'primitive'
or undeveloped".4 9
To understand the tremendous and tragic gap exemplified in these
judicial opinions, it is hardly necessary to develop expertise in American
Indian literary art, for example, or in anthropology. Moreover, one surely
must be wary of the familiar tendency to romanticize some mythic Noble
Savage. Yet this brief legal review of undramatic recent decisions
concerning Native Americans emphasizes how lacking in nuance -
indeed how primitive - contemporary judicial approaches to history,
meaning and accuracy actually are.
All these judges claim to rely on history, yet betray a failure to
remember. Whether tragedy or farce, the different judicial invocations
of history demonstrate law-office history at its worst. The judges not
only fail to comprehend the meaning of history. They are also strikingly
inept in their consideration of the history of meaning. The lack of under-
standing and the denigration of the need for mutual translation reflected
in these decisions demonstrates that our mainstream legal culture has
gleaned little from the nation's long history of partial justice toward
Native Americans. If we have learned anything from our past mistakes,
here it seems to be an urge to repeat them exactly.
It may be that to rely on history in the cause of violence is a gruesome
curse. As the Nobel Prize-winning poet Joseph Brodsky said about
the current bloodshed in the Balkans, "Whenever one pulls the trigger
in order to rectify history's mistakes, one lies. For history makes no
mistakes, since it has no purpose"."o But it is radically different when
we consider history in the context of the legitimized force - and the
legitimating functions - of remedies that judges have the power either
to impose or to reject. Judges ought to be held to a higher standard
than soldiers in the intertwined matters of history and justice.
Indeed, history should be a constant concern for those who judge.
To abuse or ignore history is to forget a crucial link. Finding out what
happened and why should be crucially relevant when judges consider
48 Traditional Literatures of the American Indian 8 (K. Kroeber ed., 1981). Kroeber
and the other authors in this compilation explore the interworking of texture, text,
and context within American Indian oral traditions, and they probe the complexity
of any translation.
49 Ibid., 9.
0 J. Brodsky, "Blood, Lies And the Trigger Of History", N.Y. Times, 4 August
1993, at A19.
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Native American legal claims. Legal amnesia is always unjust. But
injustice is compounded - and becomes almost unbearably poignant and
powerful - when failures of memory, meaning and history are invoked
to brush away the claims of Native Americans. Native Americans as
a group have been victimized by past legal machinations more than most
people in the United States. No ahistorical antiseptic can camouflage
the wound. No judicial cleansing will eliminate the stain.
